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▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▄▄ ▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀▀ ▒▒█▀▀▀▀ ▒▒█▀▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▒▒█▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀▀ ▀▒▒█▀▀ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▀▒▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▒▒▒▄▄ ▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒▄ ▒▒▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█▒▒█▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀▀ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀▀ ▒▒█ ▀▒▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█▀▀▀ ▒▒█▒▒▄▒▒█ ▀▀▀▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒█ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▄ ▀▒▒▒▒█▀▀ ▒▒▒▒▒▒█ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀ Legal Net Newsletter Volume 1, Issue 2 -- 19 April, 1993 Legal Net Newsletter is dedicated to providing information on the legal issues of computing and networking in the 1990's and into the future. The information contained in this newsletter is not to be misconstrued as a bona fide legal document, nor is it to be taken as an advocacy forum for topics discussed and presented herein. The information contained within this newsletter has been collected from several governmental institutions, computer professionals and third party sources. Opinion and ideological excerpts have been collected from many sources with prior approval. Copyright (c) 1993 Paul Ferguson -- All rights reserved. Legal Net News is released approximately twice a month. E-mail submissions, comments and editorials to: fergp@sytex.com - -- In this issue -- o Editorial Forward -- How much is too much? o Threats to Privacy -- February extract from Boardwatch Magazine on proposed Digital Telephony legislation. Article by Shari Steele, of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) o RSA & DES Encryption Control -- Vinton Cerf o "Promising technology alarms government -- Use of super-secret codes would block legal phone taps in FBI's crime work". Article by Joe Abernathy, formerly of the Houston Chronicle o Lance Rose's "SYSLAW" -- Book review by Rob Slade o White House Electronic Publications and Public Access E-Mail - FAQ o LATE BREAKING NEWS - The "Clipper Chip" debate o Further recommended legal-oriented reading - -- How much is too much? (or, When do we say no?) With the introduction of the Digital Telephony proposal last year, a virtual Pandora's box of privacy infringement was opened. Several outspoken groups were quick to speak out and take a rock-solid stance on a topic that could very well touch each of our lives in a very personal way. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and The CPSR (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility) are examples of just two such groups with a large and established electronic following who spoke out and were incensed with the ideals expressed in the desire to implement this policy. This proposal would require communications providers (such as AT&T, MCI and other carriers) and software developers who produce any type of encryption software (such as LOTUS NOTES, for example) to leave a "back door" in their services for law enforcement agencies to monitor electronic communications in plain text, "if necessary". This proposal would make it possible for the FBI, or other governmental law enforcement agencies, to actively monitor private electronic communications. Additionally, the United States Government wants to control secure methods of "personal" encryption in areas such as public key encryption by "licensing" private keys for personal use. In INFO SECURITY NEWS, Volume 4, Number 2, March/April 1993, there is an interesting article with Dorothy Denning, who is described as "...a cryptographic researcher, she wrote the widely known and highly regarded text, Cryptography and Data Security"."She currently chairs the computer science department at Georgetown University in Washington, DC." Dorothy Denning is a respected professional in the field, but she holds some rather dangerous opinions. When asked by INFO SECURITY NEWS' Timothy Garon about the subject - "GARON: 'You recently wrote a paper on the FBI's proposed bill to require communication companies to provide and maintain the ability to tap digital communications. You support the government proposal while many others in the field have taken the opposite view, that there is too much Big Brother contained in it. What is your position?' DENNING: 'It should be enacted because wiretapping is an important tool for law enforcement. It's the only tool that can be used to deal with certain criminal cases that can't be solved by other means, for example, in major cases involving narcotics, organized crime and terrorist activities. It would be a mistake to lose the capability to use that tool when, by proper designing and planning of our telecommunication systems, we can make the tool available when needed. If we lose that capability for electronic surveillance, we're potentially opening ourselves up to a situation where we won't be able to deal effectively with certain serious crimes.'" Hopefully, Legal Net News presents the details necessary to help you make a decision and take a stance, one way or the other. - Paul Ferguson, Editor, Legal Net Newsletter - -- "Threats to Privacy" "FBIs Wiretapping Proposal Thwarted" Extracted from Boardwatch Magazine, February, 1993, pages 19 - 22 (BBS Legislative Watch, Shari Steele, EFF) - "In a move that worried privacy experts, software manufacturers and telephone companies, the FBI proposed legislation to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to make it easier for the Bureau to perform electronic wiretapping. The proposed legislation, entitled 'Digital Telephony,' would have required communications service providers and hardware manufacturers to make their systems 'tappable' by providing 'back doors' through which law enforcement officers could intercept communications. Furthermore, this capability would have been provided undetectably, while the communications was in progress, exclusive of any communications between other parties, regardless of the mobility of the target of the FBI's investigation, and without degradation of service. "The privacy implications are frightening. Today, all sorts of information about who we are and what we do, such as medical records, credit reports and employment data, are held on electronic databases. If these databases have government-mandated 'tappability,' this private information could be accessed by anyone tapping in. In addition, the language in the proposed bill is vague. This is especially troubling since, under the proposal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) can keep communications products off the market if it determines that these products do not meet the DOJ's own vague guidelines. This will probably result in increased costs and reduced competitiveness for service providers and equipment manufacturers, since they will be unlikely to add any features that may result in a DOJ rejection of their entire product. And to add insult to injury, the FBI proposal suggests that the cost of this wiretapping 'service' to the Bureau would have to be borne by the service provider itself, which ultimately means you and I will be paying higher user fees. "The Electronic Frontier Foundation organized a broad coalition of public interest and industry groups, from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) and the ACLU to AT&T and Sun Microsystems, to oppose the legislation. A white paper produced by the EFF and ratified by the coalition, entitled, 'An Analysis of the FBI Digital Telephony Proposal,' was widely distributed throughout the Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Representative Don Edwards (D-California), chairs of two key committees, referred to the EFF paper as they delayed the introduction of the FBI's proposal. As Leahy stated before the Senate, 'Our goal is to assist law enforcement,' but 'without jeopardizing privacy rights or frustrating the development of new communications technologies.' The Justice Department lobbied hard in the final days to get Congress to take up the bill before Congress adjourned, but the bill never even found a Congressional sponsor (and was therefore never officially introduced). The FBI will almost certainly reintroduce "Digital Telephony" when the 103rd Congress convenes in January." - -- Date: Thu, 8 Apr 1993 17:53:32 -0400 From: BITNET list server at GWUVM (1.7f) <uunet!gwuvm.gwu.edu!LISTSERV> Subject: File: "CRYPTO ARTICLE" To: Paul Ferguson <SYTEX.COM!fergp> This cryptography article appeared Sunday, June 21. It is being forwarded to RISKS as a way of giving back something to the many thoughtful participants here who helped give shape to the questions and the article. In a companion submission [see RISKS-13.61], I include the scanned text of the NSA's 13-page response to my interview request, which appears to be the most substantial response they've provided to date. I would like to invite feedback and discussion on the article and the NSA document. Please send comments to edtjda@chron.com Promising technology alarms government -- Use of super-secret codes would block legal phone taps in FBI's crime work By JOE ABERNATHY, Copyright 1992, Houston Chronicle Government police and spy agencies are trying to thwart new technology that allows conversations the feds can't tap. A form of cryptography -- the science of writing and deciphering codes -- this technology holds the promise of guaranteeing true privacy for transactions and communications. But an array of Federal agencies is seeking to either outlaw or severely restrict its use, pointing out the potency of truly secret communications as a criminal tool. ``Cryptography offers or appears to offer something that is unprecedented,'' said Whitfield Diffie, who with a Stanford University colleague devised public key cryptography,'' an easily used cryptography that is at the center of the fight. ``It looks as though an individual might be able to protect information in such a way that the concerted efforts of society are not going to be able to get at it. ``No safe you can procure has that property; the strongest safes won't stand an hour against oxygen lances. But cryptography may be different. I kind of understand why the police don't like it.'' The National Security Agency, whose mission is to conduct espionage against foreign governments and diplomats, sets policy for the government on matters regarding cryptography. But the FBI is taking the most visible role. It is backing legislation that would address police fears by simply outlawing any use of secure cryptography in electronic communications. The ban would apply to cellular phones, computer networks, and the newer standard telephone equipment -- already in place in parts of Houston's phone system and expected to gain wider use nationwide. ``Law enforcement needs to keep up with technology,'' said Steve Markardt, a spokesman for the FBI in Washington. ``Basically what we're trying to do is just keep the status quo. We're not asking for anything more intrusive than we already have.'' He said the FBI uses electronic eavesdropping only on complex investigations involving counterterrorism, foreign intelligence, organized crime, and drugs. ``In many of those,'' he said, we would not be able to succeed without the ability to lawfully intercept.'' The State and Commerce departments are limiting cryptography's spread through the use of export reviews, although many of these reviews actually are conducted by the NSA. The National Institute of Standards and Technology, meanwhile, is attempting to impose a government cryptographic standard that critics charge is flawed, although the NSA defends the standard as adequate for its intended, limited use. ``It's clear that the government is unilaterally trying to implement a policy that it's developed,'' said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security, which holds a key cryptography patent. ``Whose policy is it, and whose interest does it serve? Don't we have a right to know what policy they're pursuing?'' Bidzos and a growing industry action group charge that the policy is crippling American business at a critical moment. The White House, Commerce Department, and NIST refused to comment. The NSA, however, agreed to answer questions posed in writing by the Houston Chronicle. Its purpose in granting the rare, if limited, access, a spokesman said, was ``to give a true reflection'' of the policy being implemented by the agency. ``Our feeling is that cryptography is like nitroglycerin: Use it sparingly then put it back under trusted care,'' the spokesman said. Companies ranging from telephone service providers to computer manufacturers and bankers are poised to intro duce new services and products including cryptography. Users of electronic mail and computer networks can expect to see cryptography-based privacy enhancements later this year. The technology could allow electronic voting, electronic cash transactions, and a range of geographically separated -- but secure -- business and social interactions. Not since the days before the telephone could the individual claim such a level of privacy. But law enforcement and intelligence interests fear a world in which it would be impossible to execute a wiretap or conduct espionage. ``Secure cryptography widely available outside the United States clearly has an impact on national security,'' said the NSA in its 13-page response to the Chronicle. ``Secure cryptography within the United States may impact law enforcement interests.'' Although Congress is now evaluating the dispute, a call by a congressional advisory panel for an open public policy debate has not yet been heeded, or even acknowledged, by the administration. The FBI nearly won the fight before anyone knew that war had been declared. Its proposal to outlaw electronic cryptography was slipped into another bill as an amendment and nearly became law by default last year before civil liberties watchdogs exposed the move. ``It's kind of scary really, the FBI proposal being considered as an amendment by just a few people in the Commerce Committee without really understanding the basis for it,'' said a congressional source, who requested anonymity. ``For them, I'm sure it seemed innocuous, but what it represented was a fairly profound public policy position giving the government rights to basically spy on anybody and prevent people from stopping privacy infringements.'' This year, the FBI proposal is back in bolder, stand-alone legislation that has created a battle line with law enforcement on one side and the technology industry and privacy advocates on the other. ``It says right on its face that they want a remote government monitoring facility'' through which agents in Virginia, for instance, could just flip a switch to tap a conversation in Houston, said Dave Banisar of the Washing ton office of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. Though the bill would not change existing legal restraints on phone-tapping, it would significantly decrease the practical difficulty of tapping phones -- an ominous development to those who fear official assaults on personal and corporate privacy. And the proposed ban would defuse emerging technical protection against those assaults. CPSR, the point group for many issues addressing the way computers affect peoples' lives, is helping lend focus to a cryptographic counterinsurgency that has slowly grown in recent months to include such heavyweights as AT&T, DEC, GTE, IBM, Lotus, Microsoft, Southwestern Bell, and other computer and communications companies. The proposed law would ban the use of secure cryptography on any message handled by a computerized communications network. It would further force service providers to build access points into their equipment through which the FBI -- and conceivably, any police officer at any level -- could eavesdrop on any conversation without ever leaving the comfort of headquarters. ``It's an open-ended and very broad set of provisions that says the FBI can demand that standards be set that industry has to follow to ensure that (the FBI) gets access,'' said a congressional source. ``Those are all code words for if they can't break in, they're going to make (cryptography) illegal. ``This is one of the biggest domestic policy issues facing the country. If you make the wrong decisions, it's going to have a profound effect on privacy and security.'' The matter is being considered by the House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Rep. Jack Brooks, D-Texas, who is writing a revision to the Computer Security Act of 1987, the government's first pass at secure computing. The recent hearings on the matter produced a notable irony, when FBI Director William Sessions was forced to justify his stance against cryptography after giving opening remarks in which he called for stepped-up action to combat a rising tide of industrial espionage. Secure cryptography was designed to address such concerns. The emergence of the international marketplace is shaping much of the debate on cryptography. American firms say they can't compete under current policy, and that in fact, overseas firms are allowed to sell technology in America that American firms cannot export. ``We have decided to do all further cryptographic development overseas,'' said Fred B. Cohen, a noted computer scientist. ``This is because if we do it here, it's against the law to export it, but if we do it there, we can still import it and sell it here. What this seems to say is that they can have it, but I can't sell it to them -- or in other words -- they get the money from our research.'' A spokeswoman for the the Software Publishers Association said that such export controls will cost $3-$5 billion in direct revenue if left in place over the next five years. She noted the Commerce Department estimate that each $1 billion in direct revenue supports 20,000 jobs. The NSA denied any role in limiting the power of cryptographic schemes used by the domestic public, and said it approves 90 percent of cryptographic products referred to NSA by the Department of State for export licenses. The Commerce Department conducts its own reviews. But the agency conceded that its export approval figures refer only to products that use cryptology to authenticate a communication -- the electronic form of a signed business document -- rather than to provide privacy. The NSA, a Defense Department agency created by order of President Harry Truman to intercept and decode foreign communications, employs an army of 40,000 code-breakers. All of its work is done in secret, and it seldom responds to questions about its activities, so a large reserve of distrust exists in the technology community. NSA funding is drawn from the so-called ``black budget,'' which the Defense Budget Project, a watchdog group, estimates at $16.3 billion for 1993. While the agency has always focused primarily on foreign espionage, its massive eavesdropping operation often pulls in innocent Americans, according to James Bamford, author of _The Puzzle Palace_, a book focusing on the NSA's activities. Significant invasions of privacy occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, Bamford said. Much more recently, several computer network managers have acknowledged privately to the Chronicle that NSA has been given access to data transmitted on their networks -- without the knowledge of network users who may view the communications as private electronic mail. Electronic cryptology could block such interceptions of material circulating on regional networks or on Internet -- the massive international computer link. While proponents of the new technology concede the need for effective law enforcement, some question whether the espionage needs of the post-Cold War world justify the government's push to limit these electronic safeguards on privacy. ``The real challenge is to get the people who can show harm to our national security by freeing up this technology to speak up and tell us what this harm is,'' said John Gillmore, one of the founders of Sun Microsystems. ``When the privacy of millions of people who have cellular telephones, when the integrity of our computer networks and our PCs against viruses are up for grabs here, I think the battleground is going to be counting up the harm and in the public policy debate trying to strike a balance.'' But Vinton Cerf, one of the leading figures of the Internet community, urged that those criticizing national policy maintain perspective. ``I want to ask you all to think a little bit before you totally damn parts of the United States government,'' he said. ``Before you decide that some of the policies that in fact go against our grain and our natural desire for openness, before you decide those are completely wrong and unacceptable, I hope you'll give a little thought to the people who go out there and defend us in secret and do so at great risk.'' - -- Dr. Vinton G. Cerf Annandale, VA 11 April 1993 The Honorable Timothy Valentine Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Dear Chairman Valentine: I recently had the honor of testifying before the Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation during which time Representative Rohrabacher (R, California) made the request that I prepare correspondence to the committee concerning the present US policy on the export of hardware and software implementing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the RSA Public Key encryption algorithm (RSA). As you know, the DES was developed by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in the mid-1970s, based on technology developed by International Business Machines (IBM). The details of the algorithm were made widely available to the public and considerable opportunity for public comment on the technology was offered. In the same general time period, two researchers at Stanford University (Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie) published a paper describing the possible existence of mathematical functions which, unlike the symmetric DES algorithm, could act in a special, pairwise fashion to support encryption and decryption. These so-called "public key algorithms" had the unusual property that one function would encrypt and the other decrypt -- differing from the symmetric DES in which a single function performs both operations. The public key system uses a pair of keys, one held private and the other made public. DES uses one key which is kept secret by all parties using it. Three researchers at MIT (Rivest, Shamir and Adelman) discovered an algorithm which met Hellman and Diffie's criteria. This algorithm is now called "RSA" in reference to its inventors. The RSA technology was patented by Stanford and MIT and a company, Public Key Partners (PKP), created to manage licensing of the RSA technology. A company called RSA Data Security, Inc., was also formed, which licensed the technology from PKP and markets products to the public based on the technology. The current policy of the United States places DES and RSA technology under export control. Because cryptography falls into the category of munitions, it is controlled not only by the Commerce Department but also by the State Department under the terms of the International Traffic in Arms regulations. Despite the public development of both of these technologies and their documented availability outside the United States over the last 15 years, US policy has been uniformly restrictive concerning export licensing. As the United States and the rest of the world enter more fully into the Information Age in which digital communications plays a critical role in the global infrastructure, the "digital signature" capability of public key cryptography is a critical necessity for validating business transactions and for identifying ownership of intellectual property expressed in digital electronic forms. Registration and transfer of intellectual property rights in works which can be represented in digital form will be central factors in the national and global information infrastructure. A number of parties are exploring technical means for carrying out rights registration and transfer, making use of public key cryptography as a basic tool. In addition, there is a great deal of current work on electronic mail systems which support privacy by means of encryption and support authenticity by means of digital signatures. One of these systems, developed in the Internet environment I mentioned in my testimony, is called Privacy-enhanced Mail (PEM) and makes use of DES, RSA and some other special "hash" functions which are integral to the production of digital signatures. For these various systems to be compatible on an international basis, it would be very helpful for the cryptographic components to be exportable on a world-wide basis. A number of vendors make produces relying on these technologies within the United States but often find it very difficult to engage in international commerce owing to the export licensing required for these technologies. Ironically, the technology appears to be widely available outside the US and also outside the COCOM countries, so US firms face both competition outside the US and export inhibitions in their attempts to develop worldwide markets. There are many valid national security reasons for limiting the export of cryptographic capabilities, since these technologies may aid an opponent in time of war or other conflict. Perhaps just as important, US intelligence gathering capability can be eroded by the availability of high grade cryptography on a worldwide basis. Recently, it has also been alleged that the world-wide availability of cryptography would also seriously impede US drug enforcement and anti-crime efforts. While these reasons seem sufficient, many have pointed out that the widespread accessibility to the detailed specifications of DES and RSA and availability and existence of software and hardware outside the US have long since done whatever damage is going to be done in respect of warfighting, crime or drug potential. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that our policies only inhibit legitimate commerce, but have little impact on the other concerns expressed. As in all such controversy, there is often some truth on both sides. The National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST), has offered alternative digital signature capability. Technical assessments of the alternative have turned up weaknesses, in the opinions of some experts. There is not yet an alternative to DES, unless it is to be found in NSA's Commercial Crypto Evaluation Program (CCEP) in which NSA proposes to provide algorithms which are implemented in hardware by industry and made available for civilian use. As I understand this program, NSA does not intend to release any details of the algorithms, leaving open questions about the nature and strength of the technology. Some experts will persist in the belief that such offerings have weaknesses which are deliberately built in and hidden (so-called "Trojan Horses") which will allow the agency to "break" any messages protected by this means. The critics complained loudly that the reasoning behind the design of certain parts of the DES algorithm (specifically the "S-boxes") was never made public and therefore that the algorithm was suspect. In fact, the DES has proven to be very strong - indeed, it may be that very fact which makes it so unpalatable in some quarters to permit its unrestricted export. It may be that the CCEP technology offered is satisfactory, but this is hard to tell without knowing more about its provenance. Presuming the wide availability of both DES and RSA technology, it seems to me appropriate and timely to re-examine US export control policy regarding these two algorithms. In all probability, any such review will require some classified testimony which will have to be heard in confidence by cleared members of your committee. I sincerely hope that the outcome will be favorable to use by US industry in international commerce, but even if the outcome results in continuation of present policy, it is timely to make such a review, in my opinion. Sincerely, Vinton G. Cerf - -- Date: 7 Apr 93 17:35 -0600 From: "Rob Slade, DECrypt Editor" <uunet!decus.arc.ab.ca!roberts> Subject: Review of "Syslaw" by Rose/Wallace BKSYSLAW.RVW 930402 PC Information Group, Inc. 1126 East Broadway Winona, MN 55987 Syslaw, 2nd ed., Lance Rose and Jonathan Wallace, 1992 The introduction to "Syslaw" states that although the title implies the existence of a new kind of law relating to electronic bulletin board systems, in reality it is simply and extension of existing laws, mores and practices. In the same way, although the book states itself to be aimed at the BBS community, and particularly sysops, there is much here of interest and moment to anyone involved with sharing information through computer systems. The book also starts with a "disclaimer": the authors suggest that any significant concerns with legal affairs be taken to a lawyer. Parts of the book may give concern to experts in the specific fields: I was disappointed by the coverage of viral programs (and rather intrigued by a somewhat idiosyncratic definition of "worm"). That aside, the book is an excellent overview of the legal situation and considerations with regard to computer communications systems. Chapter one is entitled "Your rights as a sysop", although "First Amendment" (the first amendment to the American constitution deals with "free speech") arguments seem to comprise the bulk of it. Chapter two discusses contracts, and the advisability to have a formal contract so that there is an express understanding between caller and sysop. Chapter three deals with copyright and other "intellectual property" issues. Chapter four deals with "injurious materials": it is somewhat surprising that it is not more closely related with chapters eight ("Viruses and other dangerous code") and nine ("Sexually explicit material). chapters five, six and seven deal with privacy, crime directly related to BBS operation and search and seizure, respectively. All of them rely quite heavily on examination of the existing American statutes. A number of appendices are included. B through H are copies of various related American legislation: I is a list of various state computer crime laws (although the table of contents makes reference to "Sexual Exploitation of Children"). Appendix J is an annotated bibliography of sources for further study. Interestingly, for a book supposedly targeted at BBS sysops, none of the materials are cited in "online" form. Appendix A, however, is probably of greatest interest: it is a sample "caller contract"; an agreement between the "users" and "owners" of computer systems. Written in a "folksy" style, and intended as a understanding between sysops and their "members", it is still a valuable template for any organization with online information systems and general "communications" functions such as email (and, these days, voice mail). A recommendation that I would make to the authors for the third edition is to make the book less "American". On the face of it, this might seem like a strange request. Laws vary from country to country, and it is impossible to write a book covering all possible laws. However, there are many legal precepts which are common to almost all legal systems. Chapter two of "Syslaw", for example, deals with contracts. It does so in a very general way, applicable to almost all situations. Chapter one, on the other hand, deals with the "First Amendment" to the American Constitution, and is therefore of little use to anyone in any other country. Chapter three falls into the range between: it deals with copyright and other related concepts, but from an American perspective and with specific and extensive reference to American laws. Most of the book falls somewhere into the middle ranges. Most systems managers and computer operators tend to see "systems law" primarily in relation to "pirate software". Syslaw is a valuable guide in opening discussions of many related topics which are all too often either neglected, or pass over as being of little importance. copyright Robert M. Slade, 1993 BKSYSLAW.RVW 930402 - -- From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 20:44:58 GMT Note: The following was released by the White House today in conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip encryption technology. FACT SHEET PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption Management." The directive provides for the following: Advanced telecommunications and commercially available encryption are part of a wave of new computer and communications technology. Encryption products scramble information to protect the privacy of communications and data by preventing unauthorized access. Advanced telecommunications systems use digital technology to rapidly and precisely handle a high volume of communications. These advanced telecommunications systems are integral to the infrastructure needed to ensure economic competitiveness in the information age. Despite its benefits, new communications technology can also frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance. Sophisticated encryption can have this effect in the United States. When exported abroad, it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence activities critical to our national interests. In the past, it has been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law enforcement and national security interests, while at the same time protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens. As encryption technology improves, doing so will require new, innovative approaches. In the area of communications encryption, the U. S. Government has developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through encryption that is substantially more robust than the current government standard, but also permits escrowing of the keys needed to unlock the encryption. The system for the escrowing of keys will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information only with appropriate legal authorization. To assist law enforcement and other government agencies to collect and decrypt, under legal authority, electronically transmitted information, I hereby direct the following action to be taken: INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative, shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed key-escrow microcircuits in their products. The fact of law enforcement access to the escrowed keys will not be concealed from the American public. All appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that any existing or future versions of the key-escrow microcircuit are made widely available to U.S. communications hardware manufacturers, consistent with the need to ensure the security of the key-escrow system. In making this decision, I do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key- escrow system. KEY-ESCROW The Attorney General shall make all arrangements with appropriate entities to hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits installed in communications equipment. In each case, the key holder must agree to strict security procedures to prevent unauthorized release of the keys. The keys shall be released only to government agencies that have established their authority to acquire the content of those communications that have been encrypted by devices containing the microcircuits. The Attorney General shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such communications. PROCUREMENT AND USE OF ENCRYPTION DEVICES The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate U.S. agencies, shall initiate a process to write standards to facilitate the procurement and use of encryption devices fitted with key-escrow microcircuits in federal communications systems that process sensitive but unclassified information. I expect this process to proceed on a schedule that will permit promulgation of a final standard within six months of this directive. The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications. Further, the Attorney General shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase. - -- From: uunet!toad.com!gnu (John Gilmore) Subject: White House press release on encryption policy Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 12:24:20 -0700 Note: This file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717. --------------------------------------------------- THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release April 16, 1993 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY The President today announced a new initiative that will bring the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. The initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links. For too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting Americans. Rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth, privacy and law enforcement, previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement. Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer. It is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files. While encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals. A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the "Clipper Chip" has been developed by government engineers. The chip represents a new approach to encryption technology. It can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone. It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today. This new technology will help companies protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically. At the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the "Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. Each device containing the chip will have two unique "keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device. When the device is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately in two "key-escrow" data bases that will be established by the Attorney General. Access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap. The "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices. In addition, respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings. The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption's dual-edge sword: encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists. We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities. In order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches (like the key-escrow system), the President has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates: -- the privacy of our citizens, including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes; -- the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data, under proper court or other legal order, when necessary to protect our citizens; -- the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the National Information Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of American industry in the global marketplace; and -- the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high technology products. The President has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed. The Administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a National Information Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to information. This infrastructure of high-speed networks ("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone system transmits voice. Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use. The Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law. Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet. The provisions of the President's directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available. For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758. - - --------------------------------- QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE Q: Does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations? A: No. "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. Q: Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to decipher the message? A: They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers. The key is split into two parts, which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system. Q: Who will run the key-escrow data banks? A: The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities. At this point, the Department of Justice and the Administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key-escrow data banks. Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure how strong the security is? A: This system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today. While the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities. Q: Whose decision was it to propose this product? A: The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in this decision. This approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet officials. Q: Who was consulted? The Congress? Industry? A: We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy. We have briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative. Q: Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers? A: The government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits, but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers. Product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them. Q: Who provides the "Clipper Chip"? A: Mykotronix programs it at their facility in Torrance, California, and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers. The programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future. Q: How do I buy one of these encryption devices? A: We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the "Clipper Chip" into their devices. Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today, but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing. The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." There is a false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques. Q: What does this decision indicate about how the Clinton Administration's policy toward encryption will differ from that of the Bush Administration? A: It indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public-interest groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans' privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism. Q: Will the devices be exportable? Will other devices that use the government hardware? A: Voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements. Case-by-case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices. The same is true for other encryption devices. One of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad. With this in mind, we expect export licenses will be granted on a case-by-case basis for U.S. companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad. We plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products. - -- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 16:23:44 EST Sender: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility <uunet!VTVM2.CC.VT.EDU!CPSR%GWUVM.BITNET> From: David Sobel <uunet!washofc.cpsr.org!dsobel> Organization: CPSR Civil Liberties and Computing Project Subject: CPSR Crypto Statement CPSR Crypto Statement ----------------------------------------------- April 16, 1993 Washington, DC COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS CALL FOR PUBLIC DEBATE ON NEW GOVERNMENT ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) today called for the public disclosure of technical data underlying the government's newly-announced "Public Encryption Management" initiative. The new cryptography scheme was announced today by the White House and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), which will implement the technical specifications of the plan. A NIST spokesman acknowledged that the National Security Agency (NSA), the super- secret military intelligence agency, had actually developed the encryption technology around which the new initiative is built. According to NIST, the technical specifications and the Presidential directive establishing the plan are classified. To open the initiative to public review and debate, CPSR today filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with key agencies, including NSA, NIST, the National Security Council and the FBI for information relating to the encryption plan. The CPSR requests are in keeping with the spirit of the Computer Security Act, which Congress passed in 1987 in order to open the development of non-military computer security standards to public scrutiny and to limit NSA's role in the creation of such standards. CPSR previously has questioned the role of NSA in developing the so-called "digital signature standard" (DSS), a communications authentication technology that NIST proposed for government-wide use in 1991. After CPSR sued NIST in a FOIA lawsuit last year, the civilian agency disclosed for the first time that NSA had, in fact, developed that security standard. NSA is due to file papers in federal court next week justifying the classification of records concerning its creation of the DSS. David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel, called the administration's apparent commitment to the privacy of electronic communications, as reflected in today's official statement, "a step in the right direction." But he questioned the propriety of NSA's role in the process and the apparent secrecy that has thus far shielded the development process from public scrutiny. "At a time when we are moving towards the development of a new information infrastructure, it is vital that standards designed to protect personal privacy be established openly and with full public participation. It is not appropriate for NSA -- an agency with a long tradition of secrecy and opposition to effective civilian cryptography -- to play a leading role in the development process." CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of technology on society. CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington, DC. For additional information on CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or e-mail <cpsr@csli.stanford.edu>. - -- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:17:02 -0400 From: Cliff Figallo <uunet!eff.org!fig> Subject: EFFector Online 5.06 To: eff.org!eff-news (eff-news mailing list) EFFector Online Volume 5 No. 6 4/16/1993 editors@eff.org A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424 454 lines -==--==--==-<>-==--==--==- In this issue: Initial EFF Analysis of Clinton Privacy and Security Proposal Society for Electronic Access: A New York City-based grassroots online activist group. Updated Contact List for Regional Online Activist Groups -==--==--==-<>-==--==--==- April 16, 1993 INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROPOSAL The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions of Americans. The first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues such as export controls which have effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues posed by new technology. However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before any public comment or discussion has been allowed. Apparently, the Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor. Two separate escrow agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant. The encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their communications products. This proposal raises a number of serious concerns . First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution before conducting an inquiry. The NSA-developed Clipper chip may not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips. Rather, independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets based on open standards. Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested. Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified. EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open. The public will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny. Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is adopted. What will give people confidence in the safety of their keys? Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal inquiries? In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital privacy and security. However, the "Clipper chip" solution ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before the discussion even begins. DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL: ESCROW The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of whom hold 40 bits of each key. Upon presentation of a valid warrant, the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts over to law enforcement agents. Most likely the Attorney General will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents. Some in the Administration have suggested one non-law enforcement federal agency, perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one non-governmental organization. But, there is no agreement on the identity of the agents yet. Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the communications device. A key is tied to the device, not to the person using it. CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS The Administration claims that there are no back door means by which the government or others could break the code without securing keys from the escrow agents and that the President will be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm. In order to prove this, Administration sources are interested in arranging for an all-star crypto cracker team to come in, under a security arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap doors. The results of the investigation would then be made public. GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government believes in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big customers for this product. Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, VP Al Gore, and maybe even the President. FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Berman, Executive Director Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel - -- Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 00:11:40 -0700 From: uunet!netcom.com!crunch (John Draper) Subject: My comments on the Clipper or Tapper chip, I don't know wheter or not I should post this in alt.security.pgp, or other newsgroups, but here's my official comments on what I think of the Clinton Adm "Clipper" or "Tapper" chip. Any press people are welcome to use it, and feel free to send it out wherever it will help. My official statement and comments on the "Tapper chip" ======================================================= I believe that the Clintom Admin is trying to push this idea through without giving much thought on the ramifications of this rather intreguing idea of "registering" your keys with some government agency. This overwhelming urge to "tap into" our private conversations is just going to promote private encryption and voice scrambling. It is not going to make law enforcement's job any easier to catch criminals, because they will also encrypt their voice and data. It reminds me of that popular bumper sticker "If guns are outlawed, then only outlaws will have guns". It is clear that the government considers encryption as a "weapon", used by the enemy to keep nosey people away. Look at the current export laws to convince yourself of that. I guess I can think of it as a weapon to preserve my privacy. This is not only going to get a bad reception in the industry, but it will cost the government more money by adding huge administration costs. Talk about government "FAT"? I thought our goals are to cut government spending, not add to it. Lets see!! You need two agencys (Hopefully ones that people can trust). Gee!! I cannot even think of just ONE agency that I can trust!! can you? Then, these agencys have to keep track of one half of an 80 bit key. I guess there is one key for each "clipper" chip, so there has to be the capability of millions of keys, each one has to perfectly match the other half. Then there will be people needed to "register" these "tapper" phones. Lets not even think about what happens when one decides to sell it!! MORE government FAT!!. I guess thats why they're called FAT CATS. Now, if I were a criminal, do you think I would be dumb enough to "register" my phone with the government. Of course not. I would probably get mine on the black market, or though some other illicit means!! If I were a law abiding citizen, would I trust some government agency with my encryption key? Would you?? Then, there is this classified algorithm used in the clipper chip itself. I'm sure its pretty good, and it is probably hard to attack and crack. But can you really be absolutely sure that there isn't some sort of "back door" in it?? It is clear that the industry hasn't been consulted, or ideas were not put forth in some public forum. So, where is this democratic process?? We ARE still a democracy, aren't we? How was this company that sells the "Clipper chip" selected?? Was RSA data security people contacted?? It is clear that a lot of questions have to be answered before something like this can be accepted. I just hope the right people make the right decision, and that PRIVATE encryption be the responsibility of the user, and NOT the carriers. It is important that more and more private encryption programs, equipment, etc, can be made available on the market. If RSA is two tight with their licensing fees and policys, then there should be more math whiz types making better algorithms than RSA's. The field is wide open, so lets exploit them!! John D. - -- To keep from duplicating the efforts already compiled by it's editors, LNN highly recommends reading the April 14, 1993 issue of the Computer Underground Digest (CuD)(Volume 5, Issue 27). The entire content of this particular issue discusses important legal issues which the computing public should be familiar with. To get you pointed in the right direction, this snippet of that issue outlines the topics discussed and instructions on how to get CuD are included below: 8<------ Cut Here --------------- Computer underground Digest Wed Apr 14 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 27 ISSN 1004-042X CONTENTS, #5.27 (Apr 14 1993) File 1--EFF and CPSR testimony against 18 USC 1030 Sent. Revisions File 2--CPSR Comments on 1030 Guidelines File 3--EFF Response to Proposed Sentencing Guidelines File 4--LEGISLATIVE DATA ONLINE -- AB1624 needs support File 5--AB1624 MANDATES ONLINE PUBLIC ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE RECORDS File 6--Some comments on AB1624 re online legislative access File 7--AB1624 UPDATE#1--Making Leg. Data available Online Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115. Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. EUROPE: from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893; ANONYMOUS FTP SITES: UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD. EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom) Back issues also may be obtained through mailservers at: mailserv@batpad.lgb.ca.us or server@blackwlf.mese.com - -- End of Legal Net News, v1, i2